This page was translated automatically and has not been reviewed by a human. Some wording may be inaccurate.

Back to articles

Facebook and the Media: 20 Years of a Dangerous Relationship

Over two decades, Facebook has profoundly shaped how information circulates on the Internet. After courting media outlets and lawmakers, the company has made sharp reversals repeatedly, forcing newsrooms to adapt. A history worth revisiting, as other digital players seem to be following a similar path.

In mid-October, a single sentence in Meta Business's terms of use was enough to alarm publishers and legal experts: a clause that would have allowed it to explore sites linked to business accounts to train its artificial intelligence systems. The company, which like many others seeks to fuel its AI models, exploited an expensive and resource-intensive loophole: expensive, since it plans to spend more than $100 billion in 2026; resource-intensive, because the race for data to feed these same AI systems involves both the destruction (in the literal sense) of books and the coveting of media content.

For twenty years, the social network (and also the company of the same name, which became Meta in 2021 after absorbing Instagram and WhatsApp) established itself as a strategic channel for journalism, to the point of reshaping the professions, organizations, and sometimes the editorial lines of newsrooms that depended on it. For twenty years, this same player changed the rules of the game to suit itself, repeatedly leaving media outlets to pick up the pieces. Twenty years after the launch of the News Feed, which introduced an algorithmic recommendation system to Facebook for the first time, and as other tech giants present themselves in turn as allies of the press, this story is worth revisiting to draw valuable lessons from it.

10 years of seduction

Anyone who has seen The Social Network by David Fincher knows the rather unsavory origin story of TheFacebook in 2004 (from which he would drop the article a year later). Mark Zuckerberg's project, who would join the long list of dropouts from major American universities to venture into the tech world, would experience rapid growth. For the record, before Facebook, there was Facemash: in 2003, still a student at Harvard, Zuckerberg obtained yearbooks from several university residences to create a site allowing visitors to compare two female students' faces side by side and vote for the "hottest" one. At the time, already without the consent of the people involved. The site was shut down within days by Harvard's administration.

À l’époque de TheFacebook, le pari tourne autour de la vie étudiante : se faire des “ami·es” et partager ses nouvelles, ses « tranches de vie ». Rien ne préfigure encore le rôle que la plateforme jouera dans le journalisme vingt ans plus tard. Les premières briques de cette révolution arrivent en septembre 2006, avec le News Feed. Jusque-là, il fallait visiter, à la main, le profil de chaque ami·e un·e par un·e pour voir leur actualité. Désormais, un système de recommandation algorithmique aujourd’hui connu de toustes pousse automatiquement cette activité sur la page d’accueil de chacun·e, décidant de quoi montrer, à qui, et dans quel ordre : la norme aujourd’hui pour la quasi-totalité des applications sociales. L’accueil, à l’époque, est houleux face à l’idée de voir ses publications et celles des autres passées à la moulinette d’un algorithme dont le concept est alors nouveau. Des dizaines de milliers d’utilisateur·ices protestent et un rassemblement se forme devant les bureaux de Palo Alto. Le « dropout » de Harvard ne cède pas : le News Feed fait des mécontent·es, certes, mais les fait rester plus longtemps sur la plateforme. C’est précisément cette bascule, de l’hébergement passif de contenu vers un système d’organisation et de distribution des contenus, qui régira ensuite toute la distribution de l’info, et donc toute la relation avec les médias.

A relationship that reaches a more concrete turning point with the opening to third-party developers via Facebook Platform. Launched in May 2007, it allows anyone to create an application running inside Facebook. The Washington Post tries it, for example, with The Compass, a political quiz that positions the user on a left-right spectrum, downloaded 350,000 times in a few months. Jim Brady, then editor-in-chief of the American media outlet's website, sums up the mood of the era: "The race to colonize Facebook is on (…) everyone is trying to launch an application and claim a piece of the site". Facebook makes its outreach to the press concrete in 2010 with a dedicated page, Facebook + Media, driven by a team responsible for partnerships with media outlets that provides practical advice to newsrooms on how to harness the social network's features. A rapprochement that occurs at the very moment the platform surpasses 500 million users and becomes a major source of traffic for newsrooms that have organized themselves around it as this 2010 article documents: social media editors, formats designed for sharing, incentives to produce for the platform rather than for their own site. Between 2012 and 2013, the average referral traffic that Facebook sends to news sites (according to its own figures) jumps by 170%, with extreme cases like BuzzFeed, which build their models on this flow.

The highlight of this craze: starting in 2011, at F8, Facebook's developer conference, the Washington Post and The Guardian launch "social reading" applications that automatically share on Facebook everything the user reads. Success is immediate: the Guardian claims nearly 6 million active monthly users in April 2012. But by spring, audience plummets: in less than a month, the application drops from 600,000 to fewer than 100,000 daily users. While Facebook adjusts the space given to these applications in the news feed, automatic sharing is also perceived as spam and, more importantly, no monetization is possible for media outlets. Just over a year after its launch, the application shuts down.

The video hub

And this will not be the only example of a sharp reversal. In May 2015, the platform launches Instant Articles, a system allowing articles to be read directly within Facebook. At the same time, Facebook pushes newsrooms toward video, announcing billions of daily views: a figure impossible to verify from outside, since Facebook is the sole judge of its own audience measurement. By August 2016, the company even admits to having overestimated for two years the average duration of viewing its videos.

The pattern repeats identically: Facebook sends a strong signal and newsrooms invest to respond, then the company modifies its distribution parameters, leaving media outlets to absorb the costs of their strategic shift. Among the casualties is American media outlet Mic, whose monthly Facebook video views plummeted by more than 90% between December 2017 and October 2018. The company, which had employed over a hundred people just months earlier, laid off nearly its entire team before being sold in 2018. Of course, attributing the fate of newsrooms like Mic solely to decisions by a platform like Facebook would obscure other strategic errors as this Digiday article suggests, characterizing Facebook's full responsibility as "too easy." The Columbia Journalism Review would summarize Mic's collapse at the time as the consequence of "managerial hubris and Facebook's video pivot."

Lobbying

Keen to cultivate its relationship with the press, Facebook launched the Facebook Journalism Project in January 2017: training, certification with the Poynter Institute (an American journalism training center), and funding. In 2021, the company claimed to have devoted 600 million dollars to news since 2018 and promised 1 billion more over three years, totaling 1.6 billion dollars in commitments. Sincere philanthropic investment, or something else? Ed Wasserman, a professor at UC Berkeley, would describe the company's stance in 2021 as a "cynical palliative designed to neutralize media support for antitrust initiatives (legal processes aimed at regulating monopolies, editor's note)" that Facebook already anticipated having to face.

Local News Accelerator" there in partnership with the Canadian Journalism Foundation: $2.5 million for a twelve-week mentorship program for an initial cohort of eleven local media outlets. A generosity that nonetheless deserves to be placed in context, as Columbia Journalism Review points out, having compiled in a database all of Meta's and Google's funding programs in Canada. Gabby Miller, from the Tow Center, observes support that fluctuates as regulatory threats mount, lending weight to "the argument that platform 'philanthropy' is a lobbying tactic aimed at blocking new laws".

The legislation in question? Bill C-18, introduced in April 2022, aimed at requiring platforms like Facebook and Google to negotiate compensation agreements with the media whose content they distribute, under penalty of binding arbitration. In May 2022, a month after this introduction, Facebook publishes a post asserting that journalism plays "an important role in the search for truth…", while already emphasizing that links to articles represent less than 3% of what Canadians see. A year later, it draws the conclusion to justify the coming ban: "The truth is that our users don't come to us for news." Ouch.

The law is adopted the following month, in June 2023. As of August 1st, 2023, Facebook then carries out its threat and simply bans news content. In parallel, Facebook also withdraws more broadly from other countries on its own initiative: closure of the Facebook News tab in several European countries at the end of 2023, with news representing according to the company less than 3% of content seen by users, then removal of CrowdTangle in 2024, one of the last tools allowing independent monitoring of what actually circulates on the platform.

The political shift

This withdrawal from news aligns with a political shift at Meta, embodied entirely by its CEO's personal transformation. After Meta's stock market collapse (700 billion dollars in value lost between 2021 and 2022), the company's founder undergoes a transformation: martial arts, a new fashion sense, and more aggressive rhetoric. A sudden about-face? An anonymous source told the Financial Times that after years of playing "the good guy" in a suit, he eventually got fed up: "Fuck it". While this shift can be partly explained by a strategic calculation to win favor with the Trump administration, it also stems from older resentment over pressure exerted by the previous government. Facebook's CEO notably accuses the Biden administration of having pressured the company during Covid to remove content deemed misinformation.

On January 7, 2025, this personal shift translates into company policy: ending the third-party fact-checking program in the United States, and a clear loosening of moderation rules on hate content targeting trans people, women, and immigrants. Three days later, on the podcast of Joe Rogan, who had openly supported Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential election, Zuckerberg judges the business world as "quite culturally emasculated" and advocates for a culture that celebrates aggression more.

On the political front, the company is now more cautious and employs the same disengagement strategy in the face of regulations deemed too restrictive… even if it means withdrawing rather than complying. In early October 2025, the group stops accepting any political, electoral advertising or advertising on "social issues" in the European Union, in reaction to the European regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising (TTPA), which severely restricts targeting. Rather than comply, Meta blocks everything, citing operational difficulties and legal uncertainties. The automated filtering, without prior human review, relies on keywords and struggles to distinguish an article on a political topic from activist advertising. As a result, media outlets such as La Croix and Vert see their subscription and donation campaigns suspended.

What now?

Today, the broken relationship between media and Facebook is evident in the numbers. According to data from Chartbeat published by Nieman Lab, page views generated by Facebook dropped from 4.8 billion to 2 billion between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2026, a decline of roughly 59%. Yet Facebook's use as a news source hasn't collapsed: in 2026, 40% of American adults say they regularly check news there (36% in 2020), according to the Pew Research Center. A trend that fairly well sums up the new balance of power: reading news on Facebook, yes, but increasingly less likely to visit media sites.

Faced with this disengagement, newsrooms are considering freeing themselves from the platform. But emancipating oneself is not always a choice, and the Canadian ban makes this abundantly clear. The Tyee, an independent British Columbia media outlet launched in 2003, was able to weather the shock thanks to a list of more than 80,000 email addresses built up over twenty years. Others are forced to pay Meta to reach their audience: banned, the National Observer had to resort to this option to continue having its articles appear in news feeds, through sponsored advertising: "It's ironic, of course, that we end up buying ads from that same Meta that blocked our articles," admits its director, Linda Solomon Wood. IndigiNews, a media outlet run by Indigenous women and launched in 2020, loses half its daily traffic overnight following the ban. Its publisher, Eden Fineday, calculated that she would need between $15,000 and $20,000 per year to "boost" each article through paid advertising on Meta. She considers this cost justified given the lack of an equally effective alternative for reaching often-isolated Indigenous communities, but questions its sustainability.

The ban above all revealed an effect that the debate over Bill C-18 had not anticipated: the difficulty in emerging for anyone without a preexisting community. Social networks, however flawed they may be, functioned as a storefront where a reader could stumble upon a new outlet by chance; without them, discovery becomes far more difficult. In an article we devoted to this episode, David Beers, founder of The Tyee, shared his concern: Facebook does not threaten the existence of already-established media, but "sterilizes the soil" on which future ones could grow.

This epic is first and foremost a cautionary tale. The "Facebook" of this timeline is today Meta: while the platform lost ground as a distribution channel, its other social network Instagram took over for certain media outlets that depend heavily on it for visibility. Belonging to the same group, the platform reproduces the same dependency logic and the same algorithmic opacity, and the suspension of political advertising in Europe affects Instagram as much as Facebook. At a time when other tech giants present themselves as allies to media, OpenAI, Google and others seem to be replaying Facebook's playbook: seducing publishers with licensing agreements, tools and funding programs. At least for now.

To go further

Written by Owen Huchon

Owen is a journalist and section editor. He covers issues related to editorial, economic, and technological independence in the media, with a particular focus on the internet and archiving.

All of his publications